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1 Introduction
The provision of liquidity is important for well-functioning asset markets. Liquid mar-
kets match counterparties well (immediacy), have low transaction costs (tight spreads),
and are less volatile (O’Hara, 1995).
In this paper, we study liquidity provision in the foreign exchange market. A central
question raised is the following: Who is providing liquidity? The conventional wisdom
is that market making banks are the main liquidity providers in floating exchange rate
regimes. However, from the studies by Lyons (1995) and Bjønnes and Rime (2004)
we know that dealers of market making banks have only limited overnight positions
and cannot be expected to take lasting open positions. Hence, market making banks
provide liquidity intraday, but are less likely to provide liquidity on longer horizons.
In this paper, we empirically investigate whether there is a particular group of market
participants that act as liquidity providers overnight. To address this question, we use
a unique data set from the Swedish krona (SEK) market that contains observations of
90-95% of all transactions in five different instruments on a day-to-day basis from the
beginning of 1993 up to the summer of 2002.
The study of liquidity in the foreign exchange market is particularly interesting for
at least two reasons. First, our understanding of the movements of floating exchange
rates is rather poor, and better knowledge of how the market works may improve our
understanding. Second, as a largely unregulated market, patterns of liquidity provision
have evolved endogenously. This is in contrast to several equity markets where, e.g.,
market makers have obligations to provide liquidity. Danı´elsson and Payne (2002) study
intraday liquidity in an electronic FX order book. The present paper is to the best of our
knowledge the first to study liquidity in a longer perspective for the foreign exchange
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market.
Our data allow us to distinguish between four distinct groups of market participants:
(i) Market making banks; (ii) Financial customers; (iii) Non-Financial customers; and
(iv) the Central Bank (Sveriges Riksbank). Currently there is no other data set on the
foreign exchange market that gives such broad overview of the trading of a single cur-
rency. A notable feature of our data is that the flows of different customers (Financial,
Non-Financial, and the Central Bank), will equal the flow of Market making banks.1
If flows of one group of participants are positively correlated with changes in the for-
eign exchange rate, we will see a negative correlation for another group, or groups, of
participants.
How can we identify the liquidity provider? The theory of market making pre-
dicts that a positive demand shock (i.e., a purchase by the aggressive part in the trade)
will lead the market maker to revise prices upwards, hence a positive contemporaneous
correlation between the trading decision of the aggressive part and the change of the ex-
change rate.2 The supplier of the asset, e.g., a market maker, will fill the role of liquidity
provider. There are in particular two characteristics of liquidity providers: (a) The net
flow of liquidity providers will be negatively correlated with the change in the value of
the currency; and (b) Liquidity providers match others’ demand and supply passively.
These two predictions are borne out in the data. Our findings suggest that Non-
Financial customers are the main liquidity providers overnight. First, we find a negative
correlation between the net purchases of foreign currency made by Non-Financial cus-
tomers and changes in the exchange rate. This negative correlation is matched by a
1We use the term “flow” for changes in position.
2Using the terminology of microstructure, a purchase by the aggressive part in the trade is a positive
order flow, while a sale is negative. We use the phrase “aggressive part” instead of “initiator” or “aggres-
sor” which is more common in microstructure, because a non-market making liquidity provider may also
“initiate” trades. Strictly speaking, only market makers do not initiate trades.
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positive correlation between net purchases of Financial customers and changes in the
exchange rate. The coefficients of the two groups are not only similar in absolute value,
but is also very stable. These findings lead us to conclude that the Non-Financial cus-
tomers we observe fulfill requirement (a) above, while Financial customers do not. The
fact that the foreign exchange rate and positions held by Financial and Non-Financial
customers are cointegrated suggest that the price effect is permanent.
Second, requirement (b) , that the presumed liquidity providers passively match
changes in the demand and supply of others, is tested using Granger causality. We find
that the trading of Financial customers tends to forecast the trading of Non-Financial
customers. This suggests that the Non-Financial customer group is not in the active end
of trading.
These results are not obvious. Four important issues might come to mind. First,
if these are liquidity effects, how can they be permanent? It is important to remember
that it is not liquidity effects that cause the change in the exchange rate. The exchange
rate change is due to a portfolio shock by the Financial customers. We identify the sup-
ply of liquidity that meets this portfolio shock (more on the economic intuition for the
permanent effect below). Second, it might seem counter-intuitive that Non-Financial
customers should provide liquidity. However, one should note that Non-Financial cus-
tomers in our data behave like profit-takers; they react to a change in the exchange rate.
A liquidity provider, as used here, is one who enters the market as a reaction to the
action of others. It is not necessary for the Non-Financial to perceive themselves as
liquidity providers.
Third, it is clear that the group of Financial customers must be very diversified. It
should contain a spectrum of customers from hedge funds to portfolio managers. Espe-
cially hedge funds might use a range of trading strategies. If anything, this could weaken
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our findings relative to a data set were we could identify hedge funds specifically. Last,
if Non-Financial behave like profit-takers, are they then “Friedman speculators”? The
positions of a Friedman speculator will be negatively correlated with the exchange rate
when the level is moving away from equilibrium, while the positions will be positively
correlated with the exchange when the rate is moving towards the equilibrium level.
Hence, the liquidity providers do not necessarily act as “Friedman speculators.”
Closest in spirit to this paper are those by Froot and Ramadorai (2002) and Fan and
Lyons (2003). Froot and Ramadorai (2002) have data from the global custodian State
Street Corporation, covering transactions over a period of seven years in 111 curren-
cies. Given the source of the data, it is reasonable to believe that the transactions are
those of financial customers. Fan and Lyons (2003) use data on customer trading from
Citibank. Both studies find results similar to ours for financial customers. While the
data employed by Froot and Ramadorai (2002) and Fan and Lyons (2003) only repre-
sent a small market share of total currency transactions in a currency, our data reflect
entire market activity. Also in contrast to these studies, our data allow us to directly
test how flows of different groups of customers are related to changes in the foreign
exchange rate.
To give a brief theoretical interpretation of our results, we may consider the model
by Evans and Lyons (2002). A trading day is split into three trading rounds. In the first
round, market making banks provide liquidity to customers. To offload their inventories
after trading with non-bank customers in round 1, dealers trade among themselves in
round 2. However, if there is excess demand for one currency after the round of inter-
dealer trading, the market making banks must induce the customers to hold this. The
customers in round 3 then need a risk premium to be willing to change their portfo-
lio holdings. Hence, one expects to see a positive correlation between round 1 excess
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demand for a currency and the value of this currency. Using data from the interdealer
market, Evans and Lyons (2002) find strong empirical support for such a positive corre-
lation.
In the Evans and Lyons (2002) model, market making banks provide liquidity in-
traday to round 1 customers, while round 3 customers are compensated for providing
overnight liquidity. In this model net purchases of all customers sum to zero after the
third round of trading. However, this does not mean that net purchases of a particular
group of customers must sum to zero. In light of the Evans and Lyons (2002) model, it
is possible to interpret our results such that the typical aggressive round 1 customer is
financial, while the typical liquidity providing round 3 customer is non-financial.
Our results also have implications for the exchange rate determination puzzle (see,
e.g., Meese and Rogoff, 1983; Frankel and Rose, 1995). A better understanding of the
role played by different market participants may be necessary to understand the move-
ments of exchange rates. We document cointegration between the exchange rate and net
currency positions held by Financial and Non-Financial customers, which suggests that
price effects are permanent. We also show that net flows are able to explain changes
in the foreign exchange rate at frequencies commonly used in tests of macroeconomic
models. The explanatory power is very good. Flows by Financial or Non-Financial cus-
tomers combined with interest rate differentials explain roughly 70% of changes in the
foreign exchange rate at the 90-day horizon. As mentioned, the coefficient for the net
flow of Financial or Non-Financial customers is also remarkably stable over the sample.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses liquidity provision in FX
markets. Our data is presented in Section 3. Section 4 reports the results on our attempts
to identify the liquidity provider. Section 5 provides a discussion of our results, while
Section 6 concludes.
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2 Liquidity provision in FX markets
FX dealers provide liquidity by offering bid and ask quotes to other dealers or non-bank
customers. The aggressive part in a trade buys at the ask and sells at the bid (ask >
bid). Microstructure models predict that a buy initiative will increase price, while a sell
initiative will decrease price. Two main branches of models give different explanations
for this. Inventory control models (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Ho and Stoll,
1981) focus on how risk-averse dealers adjust prices to control their inventory of an
asset. In these models, a purchase by the aggressive trader will push up prices because
the dealer typically will increase price to attract sellers when his inventory is smaller
than desired. This effect is only temporary. When the dealer has reached his target in-
ventory, the effect disappears. Information-based models (e.g., Kyle, 1985; Glosten and
Milgrom, 1985) consider learning and adverse selection problems when some market
participants have private information. When a dealer receives a trade, he will revise his
expectations (upward in the case of a buy order and downward in the case of a sell or-
der) and set spreads to protect himself against informed traders. The information effect
is permanent. The microstructure theory predicts that the flow by the aggressive trader
will be positively correlated with contemporaneous price changes. Flows of liquidity
providers, however, is expected to be negatively correlated with contemporaneous price
changes.
Dealers provide liquidity in the FX market, but mostly intraday. Dealers usually do
not take large overnight positions (see Lyons, 1995; Bjønnes and Rime, 2004). This
means that dealers will offload most of their inventories to non-bank customers before
they end the day.3 Can we expect any particular group of market participants to system-
3Mean reversion in dealer inventories is much faster in FX markets than in equity markets (Bjønnes
and Rime, 2004).
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atically fill the role of overnight liquidity provider?
Evans and Lyons (2002) develop a model with three trading rounds each day. Be-
fore quoting in round 1, all dealers receive public (macroeconomic) information r (R =
∑t rτ). After quoting in round 1 (Pi1 = P1 because all dealers have the same information),
each of the N dealers receives market orders from his own customers that aggregates into
c1
(
∑Ni=1 ci1
)
. A dealer’s customer order is not observed by other dealers, and hence are
private information.
Round 2 is the interdealer trading round. After quoting in round 2 (dealers do not
want to reveal their information, hence Pi2 = P2), the dealers trade among themselves
to share inventory risk and to speculate on their (private) information from their round
1 customer trades. Net interdealer trades initiated by dealer i (Ti2) is proportional to his
customer orders in round 1 (Ti2 = γci1). At the close of round 2, all dealers observe
the net interdealer order flow (x = ∑Ni=1 Ti2). The order flows in the interdealer trading
mirrors the customer trading in round 1. In FX markets, dealers obtain estimates of
interdealer order flows from the brokers.
In round 3, dealers use information on net interdealer order flow in round 2 to set
prices such that the public willingly absorbs all dealer imbalances. To set the round 3
price, dealers need to know (i) the total flow that the public needs to absorb, which they
learn by observing x, and (ii) the public’s risk-bearing capacity. If dealers (on average)
are long in dollars, they must reduce the price for dollars to induce customers to buy
dollars. The round 3 price is
Pi3 = P3 = P2 +βx, (1)
where β is some constants depending on the customers’ demand and the dealers’ trading
strategy.
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If customers net buy, e.g., euros in round 1, the aggregate interdealer order flow
observed at the end of round 2 will be positive because dealers try to buy back euros.
Since dealers lay off all their inventories during round 3, this means that aggregate
customer orders in round 1 and round 3 must be of similar size and with opposite sign.
We thus have
c1 =
1
γ x =−c3. (2)
Evans and Lyons (2002) test their model using data on interest rates and order flows
from the interdealer market. They show that the interdealer flows can explain a large
proportion of daily changes in foreign exchange rates (JPY/USD and DEM/USD). With-
out customer data they are not able to examine the trading in round 1 and 3 directly. So
far, this trading is a black box.
In this paper, we focus on round 1 and 3. If the typical round 1 customer is dif-
ferent from the typical round 3 customer, we may say that different types of customers
fill different roles. Round 1 customers are the active ones because they are first and
because they are responsible for the dealers’ inventory imbalances. Round 3 customers
are passive because they absorb the dealers’ imbalances.
It is important to understand that the Evans-Lyons model is a very stylized descrip-
tion of the foreign exchange market. In the real-world, trading takes place continuously.
At any point throughout the trading day, dealers can trade with one another and re-
ceive customer orders. Customer trades are executed with a wide bid/ask spread. Some
dealers will want to close out immediately the positions that results from executing a
customer order, earning money on the bid/ask spread. Other dealers will speculate on
intraday price movement. If there is excess supply or demand for a currency, which
means that dealers as a whole are not willing to keep the net position of a currency,
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dealers will adjust their prices. When adjusting prices up or down, some customers will
be induced to place orders because they find the price attractive, and thus absorb some
of the excess supply or demand. Eventually, the price of the currency has adjusted to a
level such that dealers as a whole are willing to hold their remaining positions overnight.
The price may indeed have adjusted to a price where dealers as a whole have a zero net
position.
An alternative to the first round-third round framework may be to think of the dif-
ferent customers as either pushing the market or being pulled by the market.4 Push-
customers initiate price rises or falls through their net buy or sell orders. Their trading
will be positively correlated with price movements. Pull-customers are customers that
are attracted into the market by prices which suit them because they wish to trade on a
certain side of the market and decide to act now rather than postpone the trade in the
hope of achieving a better price. Their trading will be negatively correlated with price
movements.
3 Data from the Swedish krona vs. euro market
The Riksbank receives daily reports from a number of Swedish and foreign banks (pri-
mary dealers or market makers, ten as of spring 2002) on their buying and selling of
five different instruments (spot, forward, short swap, standard swap and option). In our
sample, stretching from January 1993 to June 28, 2002, a total of 27 reporting banks are
represented. Only five banks are represented in the whole sample, and there are never
more than 15 at any point of time. The reporting banks are anonymized, but we know
whether they are Swedish or foreign. The two largest Swedish banks conduct about
4We are grateful to professor Mark P. Taylor for suggesting the terms “push”- and “pull”-customers.
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43% of all gross trading in the market. The reported series is an aggregate of Swedish
krona (SEK) trading against all other currencies, measured in krona, and covers 90–95%
of all worldwide trading in SEK. Close to 100% of all interdealer trading and 80–90%
of customer trading are in SEK/EUR. In our analysis we will therefore focus on the
SEK/EUR exchange rate.
Aggregate volume information is not available to the market. Foreign exchange mar-
kets are organized as multiple dealer markets, and have low transparency. The specific
reporter only knows his own volume and a noisy signal on aggregate volume that its
receive through brokers. Reporting banks obtain some statistical summaries of volume
aggregates from the Riksbank, but only with a considerable lag. The data set used in
this paper is not available to market participants.
The trades of a Market making bank i (MMi) can be divided into (i) trades with
other Market making banks (MM− trade), (ii) trades with Financial customers (FIN),
(iii) trades with Non-Financial customers (NON−FIN), and (iv) trades with Sveriges
Riksbank (CB). The sum of this trading will amount to the change in the currency
position (flow) of the Market making bank. Throughout, we will let these names indicate
net positions, where accumulation of flows begins January 2, 1993. By definition we
have
∆(MM−T RADE)i +∆(FIN)i +∆(NON−FIN)i +∆CBi =−∆MMi, (3)
where all positions are measured as a more positive number if holdings of foreign cur-
rency increase.
Our data also let us know whether a counterparty is Swedish or foreign. In this
paper, nationality is not an important distinction when addressing our research question.
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In the traditional portfolio balance model, however, the focus is on nationality. This is
probably mainly a reflection of data availability. As there has been no data on actual
currency transactions, researchers have used the current account as a proxy for portfolio
shifts over time. As we have data on currency transactions, we need not consider this
limitation. However, we do test for the importance of nationality as an explanatory
factor in our models (see Section 5).
Swedish Market makers have 74% of the Financial customers’ trading and 83% of
the Non-Financial customers’ trading. The Financial market share of all customer trades
is 60% for our data set (the market share of Non-Financial customers is thus 40%).
These numbers are very close to the market shares reported by the triennial statistics
published by the Bank for International Settlements for all currency markets, in which
the customer market share of Financial customers has increased from 43% in 1992 to
66% in 2001. Measured over all years, their market share is 56%. The central bank
is barely present in the sample, only 0.4% of total trades. Most of the transactions by
Sveriges Riksbank in our sample are related to Swedish government debt.5
In this paper we focus on net changes in currency positions, or currency risk (for a
discussion of gross flows, see Bjønnes, Rime and Solheim, 2005). How should we mea-
sure currency positions? A swap is by definition a position that net itself out. In other
words, we can ignore trading in swaps. Options may contain interesting information.
However, the option market in SEK is limited. To get a picture of currency positions,
we focus on the sum of net spot and forward positions. Only using spot positions would
give a distorted picture of the risk the participants are willing to take. Our data shows
a significant negative correlation between spot and forward positions for all types of
5Our data allows us to separate central bank interventions from other types of central bank trades. In
our data set, there are only a few episodes with interventions (see Solheim, 2004, for more details).
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participants. The correlation when measured in changes (flows) is about -0.7.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for different groups at the 30-day hori-
zon. None of the series are normally distributed. Most of the non-normality is due
to skewness. We see that skewness for Financial and Non-Financial customers have
opposite signs. Also, the standard deviations are of similar size.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on currency flows at the 30-day horizon.
Financial Non-fin. Market Central
customers customers makers bank
Mean -0.56 -0.03 0.36 0.23
Std. Dev. 1.21 1.13 0.73 0.25
Skewness 0.34 -0.29 -0.41 0.12
Kurtosis 3.78 3.19 4.50 3.31
Sample: 1.1994-6.2002. All series are in SEK 10 billion.
From Table 1 we see that Market making banks (to some extent) tend to accumulate
foreign currency (positive mean). To understand this finding, we should remember that
the banks have operations other than market making. Market making dealers (and the
proprietary trading desk) may hold some overnight positions, but the positions will not
accumulate over time. This currency risk is probably held by the customers of the bank
through different funds etc. offered by the bank. These customers can be both financial
or non-financial.
Correlations between flows can give a first clue on liquidity provision. The corre-
lation between the flows of Market making banks and Financial customers is negative,
as we would expect, at -0.46. Note, however, the strong negative correlation, -0.80,
between flows of Financial and Non-Financial customers.
Table 2 shows the correlation between flows and some macro variables at the quar-
terly frequency. By considering the quarterly frequency we may include the current
account and the trade balance. We see that Financial customers tend to buy foreign cur-
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rency when the bond returns in Sweden increase relative to German bond returns (return
on ten-year bonds). For three-month interest rates this relationship is much weaker. We
also see that Financial customers tend to buy Swedish kroner when the return on the
Swedish stock market increases relative to the world stock market, and in particular
when the Swedish stock market return increases. These stock market-FX correlations
are well-known among FX dealers. For measures of inflation, current account and the
trade balance, there are no significant correlations with flows of Financial customers.
For Non-Financial customers we find a negative correlation between changes in rela-
tive bond returns and net flows. When the relative performance of the Swedish stock
market increases, Non-Financial customers tend to sell Swedish kroner. Interestingly,
we see that flows of Non-Financial customers are heavily correlated with the current
account and trade balance. This suggests that, to some extent, these customers can be
characterized as “current account traders.”6
Table 2: Correlations between changes in net holdings of foreign currency and some
macro variables at the quarterly horizon
Financial Non-Financial Central
customers customers Bank
∆(RDIF10Y) 0.25 -0.13 -0.07
∆(RDIF3M) 0.04 0.04 -0.21
∆(STOCK DIF) -0.25 0.26 -0.25
∆(STOCK SWE) -0.45 0.35 -0.10
∆(CPI SWE-CPI GER) -0.04 0.05 -0.20
Current account 0.01 -0.41 0.35
Trade balance -0.05 -0.36 0.56
Sample: 1.1993-6.2002. Change in variable is indicated by “∆.” RDIF10Y is the difference between the yield to maturity for
Swedish and German bonds with ten years to maturity. Similarly, RDIF3M is the difference between Swedish and German 3-month
interest rates. STOCKDIF is the difference between the return on Swedish and European (ex. Sweden) stock market indexes, while
STOCK SWE is the return on the Swedish stock market index. D(CPI SWE)−D(CPI GER) measures the difference between
Swedish and Foreign inflation.
While flows of Financial customers show no significant correlation with the cur-
6We do not mean that their trades are only related to the current account. For instance, Non-Financial
customers contribute to direct investments.
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rent account and the trade balance, we see that flows of the central bank are positively
correlated with the current account and trade balance. This may be explained by the
increased foreign borrowing during the first half of the nineties by the central bank on
behalf of the Swedish Debt Office. Table 2 suggests that Non-Financial customers are
their (final) counterpart in these trades (the correlation between these flows is -0.28).
4 Empirical results
In this section, we provide our empirical results. First, we test for cointegration between
the foreign exchange rate and positions held by Financial and Non-Financial customers
(accumulated flows). Second, we examine the short-run dynamics at different horizons,
from the daily to the 90-day horizon. We need to establish that there is a systematic
correlation between the trading of a group and the exchange rate, and that this correla-
tion is matched (and has the opposite sign) for some other group. Third, to convince
the reader that the data matches the theoretical predictions about liquidity provision we
need to establish that the flows of the group positively correlated with the exchange rate
is actually the active part of the market (round 1 player), while the group with negative
correlation between their flows and the exchange rate is on the passive side (round 3
player).
In all regressions, we use the log of the SEK/EUR measured at close of the Swedish
market (shown in Figure 1). However, such a series is only available starting January
1, 1994. Hence, all regressions begin at this point. We use the 10-year bond yield
differential and the 3-month interest rate differential as proxies for macroeconomic
variables.The 10-year differential may capture long-term macroeconomic expectations
while the 3-month differential captures short-term expectations.
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Figure 1: The SEK/EUR exchange rate
Sample: 1.1994-6.2002. Note that for observations prior to January 1, 1999, we use DEM instead of EUR. Before January 1, 1999
the majority of SEK trading was conducted in DEM as it is currently conducted in EUR.
4.1 Cointegration
The Evans-Lyons model presented in Section 2 implies the following four testable im-
plications,
Pt = α
t
∑
τ=1
rτ+βc1
t
∑
τ=1
c1,τ, (4a)
Pt = α
t
∑
τ=1
rτ+βx
t
∑
τ=1
xτ, (4b)
Pt = α
t
∑
τ=1
rτ−βc3
t
∑
τ=1
c3,τ (4c)
c1 =
x
γ =−c3, (4d)
where P is the level of the exchange rate, r is public macroeconomic information, and
c1, x, and c3 is round 1 customers’ flow, aggregated interdealer order flow, and round
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3 customers’ flow, respectively. The three first equations are cointegrating relations
(levels), while the fourth describes the relation between daily flows. Our data allows es-
timation of the three relations in Eqs. (4a), (4c), and (4d), and our discussion henceforth
will therefore refer to these equations.7
As a set of predictions of a unified theory it is preferable to estimate the equations
as a system. The two cointegrating relations in Eqs. (4a) and (4c) cannot, however, be
estimated together because they would be expected to be identical. One could instead
estimate one of the price relations together with the relation between daily flows of the
customers, Eq. (4d). As discussed in Section 2, in reality the flows of the customers
will not match perfectly on a day-to-day basis. One implications of this is that Eq. (4d)
should rather be interpreted as a steady state relation, and hence could be estimated as
part of a cointegrating system (with positions instead of flows). We therefore look at
two equivalent versions of the same system. In the first version, we estimate the price
equation with the position of Financial customers, Eq. (4a), and the steady state relation
between the two customer groups, Eq. (4d). In the second version we replace Financial
customers with Non-Financial customers, Eq. (4c).
The cointegrating equations are estimated using the Johansen method on daily ob-
servations. We include the 3-month and 10-year interest rate differentials in the esti-
mations. Interest-differentials are usually assumed to be stationary. However, in the
sample they are clearly non-stationary. Including a stationary variable in the cointe-
gration framework may affect the cointegration tests. On the other hand, treating a
non-stationary variable, in the sample, as stationary in the cointegration framework may
have implications for the inference. We therefore choose to treat the interest variables
7The cointegration vector with interdealer order flow is, however, analyzed by Killeen, Lyons and
Moore (2004). They find that the predicted properties hold.
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as non-stationary in order to get the correct inference.
Unit root tests show that all variables in the cointegrating vectors are non-stationary.8
We only model the exchange rate and the two customer positions in the VAR, while
the other variables in the cointegration analysis are restricted to be within the vectors.
Differences of these other variables enter the VAR as exogenous.
Panel a) of Table 3 shows the final version of the two sets of cointegrating vectors.
The price equations are normalized on the exchange rate, while the steady state posi-
tion equation is normalized on Non-Financial customers’ position. Panel b) reports the
error correction terms. The columns refer to the cointegrating vector in question, while
the rows represent the equations in the VAR where the vectors enter. The restrictions
we impose are (a) that either Financial or Non-Financial positions are excluded from
the cointegration vector and (b) that both Financial and Non-Financial positions are ex-
cluded from the error correction term of the equation standardized on the exchange rate.
All restrictions are found to hold, as reported in panel c) of the table.9
From the two price relations, columns 2 and 4, we see that the two position coef-
ficients are significant. As expected, Financial customers act as the aggressive traders,
while the negative coefficient for the Non-Financial customers is consistent with these
being liquidity providers. Furthermore, the cointegrating equations for the positions,
columns 3 and 5, show that the two groups indeed match each other, as predicted by Eq.
(4d).
The restrictions on the error correction term indicate that the position of both groups
8An exception is the position of the Central Bank. While the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejects the
null of unit root at the 10%-level, other tests like the Ng-Perron, Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin, and
Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock test clearly indicate a unit root. The question is therefore unresolved. Excluding
the Central Bank does not seem to affect the cointegration tests. All stationarity tests are available from
the authors at request.
9A less restricted version is available from the authors at request.
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Table 3: Cointegration results, daily observations
Financial Non-Financial
a) Cointegration SEK/EUR Non-Fin pos SEK/EUR Non-Fin pos
Financial 0.0092 -1 0 -1
(0.0036) (–) (–) (–)
Non-Financial 0 -0.0063
(–) (0.0021)
10-year bond diff. 4.83 0 3.52 0
(1.42) (–) (1.36) (–)
3-month diff. -1.89 0 -1.38 0
(1.00) (–) (1.09) (–)
CB-position 0 -1.68 0 -1.83
(–) (0.20) (–) (0.26)
MM-position 0 -0.65 0 -0.53
(–) (0.19) (–) (0.24)
Trend 0.00020 0 0 0
(0.00006) (–) (–) (–)
b) Error correction term
∆SEK/EUR -0.0131 -0.000121 -0.0121 -0.000047
(0.0029) (0.000054) (0.0030) (0.000041)
∆NonFinancial 0 -0.001863 0 -0.001635
(–) (0.000541) (–) (0.000473)
∆Financial 0 0 0 0
(–) (–) (–) (–)
c) Test Test stat. p-value Test stat. p-value
LR test of restrictions 4.84 0.85 8.09 0.62
No. Observations 2214 2214
Sample: 1.1994-6.2002. Cointegration estimated with the Johansen-method. The VAR models the exchange rate change and the
flow of the two customer groups. The other variables in the cointegrating vectors are not modeled. Differences of these, and one
lag of differences, are included in the VAR. The VAR contains two lags, determined by F-test. Standard errors of coefficients in
parenthesis. The SEK/EUR cointegrating vectors are normalized on the exchange rate, while the position cointegrating vectors in
column Non-Fin pos are normalized on the position of the Non-Financial customers. Cointegration results are reported as if the
normalizing variable is a left-hand-side variable. Panel b) reports the error correction term. The columns indicate the cointegrating
vector, while the rows indicate which equation in the VAR the vector enters. All cells without standard error are the result of
restrictions. The test of the restrictions is reported in panel c).
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of customers is weakly exogenous to the price. This is reasonable, given that we expect
Financial customers to “push” the market utilizing private information. The fact that the
effect from their trading is positive and persistent is an indication that there indeed is an
information effect. The trend enters significantly in the price equation for the Financial
customers, but not for the Non-Financial (restricted to zero). Engle and Yoo (1991) sug-
gest that the trend captures other unobservable variables. If the trading of the Financial
customers are partly driven by information that has not yet reached the market, while
the Non-Financial customers act as liquidity providers, we would expect that the trend
should enter the price equation with the position of Financial customers but not in the
price equation of the Non-Financial customers. The intuition for the weak exogene-
ity of the position of Non-Financial customers is that the banks “pick” price-quantity
combinations along their supply curve. One can think of this as if Non-Financial cus-
tomers placed a limit-order schedule in the market in the morning. Weak exogeneity
allows us to run single-equation error correction models with contemporaneous flow as
an exogenous variable. We return to this below.
4.2 Regressing exchange rate changes on customers’ flows and changes
in interest rates
Having established that there is a long-term relation between the net positions of cus-
tomers (accumulated flow) and the exchange rate, we proceed to look at the relation
between net flows (changes in net positions) and changes in the exchange rate. The
cointegration analysis established evidence of liquidity provision in the long run. By
studying short-run dynamics we can say something about liquidity provision overnight.
In all regressions, we include the error correction term from the cointegration anal-
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ysis presented above. As the two price cointegration vectors are equivalent, we use the
vector estimated using Non-Financial positions, as presented in Table 3. Using the price
vector with Financial positions would not alter any results. To utilize the fact that we
have access to daily data, we apply a standard GMM procedure to account for the fact
that we have overlapping observations when we look at changes beyond one day.
Table 4: Flows and returns
5 days 30 days 90 days
coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat.
Constant 0.11 4.23 ** 0.49 4.86 ** 1.13 6.57 **
∆Financial 0.0037 4.02 ** 0.0055 5.41 ** 0.0071 5.30 **
∆RDIF10Y 3.18 12.61 ** 3.08 7.50 ** 2.99 7.13 **
∆RDIF3M 0.80 2.88 ** 0.79 1.79 0.64 1.58
COINT(-n) -0.05 -4.21 ** -0.21 -4.81 ** -0.49 -6.48 **
R2 0.30 0.50 0.72
5 days 30 days 90 days
coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat.
Constant 0.11 4.10 ** 0.48 4.34 ** 1.14 5.85 **
∆Non-Financial -0.0030 -3.05 ** -0.0052 -4.85 ** -0.0067 -5.03 **
∆RDIF10Y 3.19 12.19 ** 3.22 7.18 ** 3.23 7.05 **
∆RDIF3M 0.83 2.93 ** 0.88 1.83 0.74 1.55
COINT(-n) -0.05 -4.08 ** -0.21 -4.32 ** -0.50 -5.85 **
R2 0.29 0.48 0.69
Sample: 1.1994-6.2002. The table shows a GMM regression on (log(SEK/EUR)t − log(SEK/EURt−n), where n indicate the
number of days over which we measure the return; 5, 30 and 90 days respectively. Similarly, “∆” in front of a variable indicates
change from t−n to t. Net positions in currency are measured in SEK 10 billion. “Financial” is net positions of Financial customers,
“Non-Financial” are net positions of Non-Financial customers. RDIF10Y is the difference between the yield to maturity for Swedish
and German bonds with ten years to maturity. Similarly, RDIF3M is the difference between Swedish and German 3-month interest
rates. Coint(-n) is the error correction term from the cointegration analysis.
The cointegration vector is lagged with n periods. Estimations are made using daily data and overlapping samples. They are
estimated using GMM, with a weighting matrix that equals the set of exogenous variables, and standard errors are calculated using
a variable Newey-West bandwidth.
**(*) Statistical significance at the 1%(5%) level.
Table 4 reports regressions of changes in the foreign exchange rate on currency flows
of Financial and Non-Financial customers for the 5-day, 30-day and 90-day horizon. As
is clear from Table 4, the sign on the coefficient for Financial customers is positive and
significant at all horizons reported. The coefficient increases from 0.37% at the 5-day
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horizon to 0.71% per SEK 10 billion at the 90-day horizon. These numbers are econom-
ically significant. For instance, at the 30-day horizon the standard deviation of currency
flows of Financial customers is 12 billion SEK. An increase of one standard deviation
in the net flow of Financial customers will then, on average, imply an increase in the
foreign exchange rate of 0.66%. For comparison, the standard deviation for changes in
the foreign exchange rate over the 30-day horizon is 2.33%.
The coefficient for the error correction term is negative and significant for all hori-
zons reported. At the five-day horizon, return to the long-run equilibrium takes place by
5% in each period. For the 30-day and 90-day horizon, the adjustment to the long run
equilibrium takes place by 21% and 49% in each period, respectively.
The coefficient for changes in the ten-year interest rate differential is positive and
significant for all time horizons. An increase in the ten-year interest rate differential may
signal expectations of higher inflation in Sweden relative to Germany and the other euro-
countries. The strong correlation between the exchange rate and the 10-year interest rate
differential in Sweden is well known in the Swedish market and is mainly due to the fact
that when Sweden emerged from recession in the early 1990’s, the interest rate spread
narrowed and the exchange rate strengthened. The coefficient for changes in the three-
month interest rate differential is only significant at the five-day horizon. The coefficient
is positive, which means that an increased interest rate differential is consistent with a
depreciating SEK.
The explanatory power is very good. The regressions explain as much as 30-72% of
all variation in the dependent variable.
In the lower part of Table 4, we replicate the estimations, only substituting flows of
Financial customers with flows of Non-Financial customers. As we see, the coefficient
for Non-Financial customers is also highly significant for all time horizons. The co-
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efficient size changes from -0.30% at the 5-day horizon to -0.67% per SEK 10 billion
at a horizon of 90 days. The coefficients for the error correction term and the macro
variables are similar to those reported for the regressions with Financial customers.
Again, the explanatory power is very good. Between 29% and 69% of all variation in
the dependent variable is explained by the regressions. Furthermore, we notice that the
coefficient for Non-Financial customers is almost exactly the opposite of the coefficient
on Financial customers. This is an indication that Non-Financial customers also provide
liquidity on shorter horizons.
It is sometimes argued that the relation between flows and changes in the exchange
rate should be of a short-term nature. The cointegration results presented above suggest
otherwise. This is also confirmed in a dynamic setting. As we can see from Table 4,
both the size of the coefficient and the t-statistic on the flow actually tend to increase as
we lengthen the horizon. This result is further confirmed in Figure 2. Here, we graph the
coefficient for the flow variable for both Financial and Non-Financial customers when
estimated at horizons from one day to 250 days. The regression is equivalent to the
regressions presented in Table 4, and the sample covers the same period. As we can
see, the absolute value of the coefficient increases in size for both variables when we
move from returns measured from 1 to 100 days. Beyond 100 days, the coefficient size
stabilizes.10
An interesting question is parameter stability. It is well known that coefficients from
regression for exchange rates do not tend to be very stable when one changes the sample
period under investigation. However, the findings in Table 4 are remarkably resilient to
changes of this kind. In figure 3, we report the coefficient for both Financial and Non-
10This is consistent with results by Evans and Lyons (2004), who find that it takes more than a quarter
for all information contained in order flow to be impounded in the exchange rate.
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Figure 2: The coefficient for flows of (a) Financial and (b) Non-Financial customers,
respectively, for different time horizons
The figure displays the coefficient +/- 2 standard errors when we change the length of the overlap in the GMM regression from 1 to
250 days. The regressions estimated are equal to the estimations presented in Table 4. The time sample is Jan. 1, 1994 to June 28,
2002. Panel (a) shows the coefficient for Financial customers, while panel (b) shows the coefficient for Non-Financial customers.
Financial customers, when we use 30-day return. We estimate a rolling regression with a
3-year window. As one can see, the main result, that flows of Financial customers have a
positive impact, while flows of Non-Financial customers have a negative impact, is valid
for all possible 3-year samples from 1994 to 2002. This stability reflects significant
differences in behavior between the two groups of customers.
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Figure 3: Rolling estimations of the coefficient (+/-2SE) using a 3-year window
The figure displays the coefficient +/- 2 standard errors when we estimate the GMM regression with a 30-day overlap, as described
in Table 4, using a rolling regression with a 3-year window. The first coefficient is the value for a regression on the sample from
Jan. 1, 1994 to Dec. 31, 1996. Panel (a) shows the coefficient for Financial customers, while panel (b) shows the coefficient for
Non-Financial customers.
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4.3 Short-run dynamics
This subsection addresses two questions: Do Non-Financial customers provide liquidity
at all horizons, also the short term? And, do Market making banks only provide liquidity
intraday, or also at lower frequencies? Table 5 addresses short run dynamics for horizons
from one up to ten days. The regressions presented in Table 5 are similar to those
reported in Table 4, except for the time horizons reported and that we may include flows
of different market participants in a single regression (also Market making banks). We
can not, however, include flows of Financial customers, Non-Financial customers and
Market making banks in a single regression. This will give rise to high multicollinearity
since flows of the central bank is small. We thus include only two groups in a single
regression.
In Table 5, we separate between participants that push the market in the upper panel,
and participants that pull the market in the lower panel. We run two regressions, one
with both Financial and Non-Financial customers’ flow (upper panel), and the second
with Non-Financial and Market making banks’ flow. “Financial” under the heading
“Variable” means that we report the coefficient for net flow of Financial customers. We
notice that Non-Financial customers are included as participants that both push and pull
the market. As we will see, they push the market at the daily horizon, however, at all
other horizons they pull the market (i.e., provide liquidity).
In the regression including both Financial and Non-Financial customers, the coef-
ficient for Financial customers is 0.38% at the daily horizon. The coefficient for Non-
Financial customers is 0.34% at the daily horizon. Thus, at the daily horizon, both Fi-
nancial and Non-Financial customers are predominantly push customers. For the 5-day
and 10-day horizon, the coefficient for Financial customers is still positive and signif-
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Table 5: Flows, returns and short run dynamics.
Variable 1 day 5 day 10 day
Push Financial 0.0038 ** 0.0034 * 0.0039 *
Non-Financial 0.0034 ** -0.0004 -0.0005
Pull Non-Financial -0.0008 -0.0041 ** -0.0044 **
Market makers -0.0053 ** -0.0011 ** -0.0005 **
The table displays the coefficients for the respective flow coefficients. All estimations follow the set up in Table 4, and are estimated
using GMM, including the change in the 3 month interest differential, 10 year interest differential and the lagged cointegration
vector. 1 day, 5 days and 10 days refer to 1, 5 and 10 day overlapping samples. We run two regressions, one with both Financial and
Non-Financial customers’ flow (upper panel), and the second with Non-Financial and Market making banks’ flow (lower panel).
“Financial” under the heading “Variable” means that we report the coefficient for net flow of Financial customers.
**(*) Statistical significance at the 1%(5%) level.
icant. However, the significance level decreases from 1% to 5%. This is because we
include flows by both Financial and Non-Financial customers in the regression. When
the time horizon increases these changes become more similar in absolute value, but
with opposite sign. Hence, including both in a single regression gives rise to multi-
collinearity. The coefficient for Non-Financial customers is insignificant at the 5-day
and 10-day horizon in the regression including both Financial and Non-Financial cus-
tomers.
In the regression including Non-Financial customers and Market making banks, we
see that the coefficient for Non-Financial customers is insignificant at the daily horizon.
This should be no surprise since we know that at this horizon the Non-Financial cus-
tomers are predominantly push customers. The coefficient for Market making banks is
-0.53% at the daily horizon. This result shows that Market making banks act as liquidity
providers at the daily horizon. At horizons beyond one day, Non-Financial customers
become more and more important as liquidity providers. The role of Market making
banks as liquidity providers is decreasing with time horizon. The coefficient for Mar-
ket making banks increases from -0.53% at the daily horizon to -0.05% at the 10-day
horizon.
To sum up, we find a positive correlation between net currency flows and changes in
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the exchange rate for Financial customers at all horizons studied. At the one-day hori-
zon, this positive correlation is matched by a negative correlation between the flow for
Market making banks and changes in the foreign exchange rate. When the time horizon
increases, Non-Financial customers become more important as liquidity providers.
4.4 Identifying “passive side”: Granger causality — flows on flows
We continue by using the Granger causality test to address the other aspect of liquidity
provision, that of matching trades “passively.” The Granger causality test indicates the
ability of one series to forecast another. The idea is that if the trading of Non-Financial
customers forecasts the flow of Financial customers, we can hardly say that they are on
the passive side.
Granger causality is estimated using a standard bivariate framework. This means
that we estimate whether the flow of one group can forecast the flow of the other group.
We report regressions estimated with 2 lags. However, the results do not change if we
change to, e.g., 1 or 3 lags. No tests indicate other lag lengths than these. Results from
the Granger causality tests are reported in Table 6.
Table 6: Granger causality tests using 2 lags. Daily observations
Does not cause: Financial Non-Financial MM
Financial na. 0.00 0.45
Non-Financial 0.72 na. 0.72
Market-mak. 0.34 0.00 na.
Sample: 1.1994-6.2002. Table presents the probabilities from Granger causality tests. The hypothesis tested is whether the variable
in the left column does not cause the variable in the upper row. All variables included are first differential of net positions (i.e.,
flow). The estimations are based on bivariate estimations. We only report probability of rejection.
We cannot reject the hypothesis that flows of Non-Financial customers do not Granger-
cause the other flows. However, we can reject that the Financial customers and Market
making banks do not cause the flows of Non-Financial customers. This leads us to con-
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clude that Non-Financial customers are on the passive side of the trading. Further, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that no other group causes the change in the positions of
Financial customers. Together with the regression results from the previous section this
suggests the Financial customers are a first mover (push customers).
5 Discussion
Our results suggest that different market participants play different roles. Financial
customers will typically “push” the market. Market making banks provide liquidity in
the short run, while Non-Financial customers are important as liquidity providers in the
longer run.
Nationality is not important when explaining our results. We experiment with re-
gressions (results available on request) where we distinguish between Swedish and For-
eign (i) Financial customers, (ii) Non-Financial customers, and (iii) Market making
banks. Nationality does not make any significant difference in any of the regressions.
Significant differences only exist between different groups of market participants. As
we have seen, the relations between changes in the foreign exchange rate and the flow
of Financial or Non-Financial customers is very stable.
To interpret our results, we may consider the fact that Financial and Non-Financial
customers participate in other markets than the foreign exchange market. It may be rea-
sonable to assume that a substantial amount of trading by Financial customers is related
to portfolio investments. For these kinds of investments, stock markets are of special
importance. Stock markets are volatile, and large price changes can occur at short no-
tice. To give an example; the standard deviation of the Swedish stock index (daily data,
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from 1.1994 to 6.2002) was 1.6% compared with 0.5% for the exchange rate.11 The
maximum daily return in the stock market was 11.9% compared with 1.9% in the for-
eign exchange market. Given this kind of volatility, timing is extremely important. It
is much more important to time correctly the investment in the stock market, than to
wait for the appropriate exchange rate. Hence, it seems reasonable that they are push
customers.
Trading in stock markets would not affect the exchange rate if currency positions are
hedged. It is well known that investors in stock markets do not usually hedge currency
risk.12 Two possible reasons are that currency risk is small compared to overall risk,
and that it may be difficult to hedge currency risk when future cash flows are uncertain.
Non-Financial customers, on the other hand, probably trade currency either to con-
duct current account trading, or to make foreign direct investments. For these kinds
of transactions, the minute-to-minute considerations play a less important role in in-
vestment timing. In contrast to many asset prices, most prices for goods only change
slowly. In this case, the FX part may be very important. For Non-Financial customers,
the exchange rate may be viewed as an option, i.e., the customer can wait to make the
transaction until the exchange rate becomes “sufficiently” attractive. For instance, if the
dollar appreciates against the euro, US goods, like airplanes from Boeing, will become
relatively more expensive compared to European goods, like Airbus. If the USD/EUR-
rate is 1.40, most airline companies will choose to buy new airplanes from Boeing,
hence buying dollars. However, if the dollar appreciates to 1.00 it is likely that many
airline companies will exercise their option and rather buy from Airbus, and hence buy
euros and sell dollars.
11The stock exchange is measured by the log of the MSCI index for Sweden, and the exchange rate as
the log of the SEK/EUR.
12In less volatile asset markets, we often see that currency risk is hedged.
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Assume that Financial customers buy dollars because they want to buy US assets.
They are “pushing” the market, and the dollar will appreciate. The dollar will appreciate
such that Non-Financial customers find it attractive to sell the dollars. They are pull
customers. A stronger dollar makes it attractive for Non-Financial customers to sell
dollars, and buy euros, because European goods become relatively less expensive.
A natural question to ask is whether a particular group is systematically making prof-
its or losses. An implication of the above argument is that financial customers may be
willing to pay a premium in the foreign exchange market in order to buy assets denom-
inated in foreign currencies. Since Financial customers are willing to pay a premium,
this means that Non-Financial customers can sell at high prices and buy at low prices.
Non-Financial customers behave as profit takers. Non-Financial customers buy and sell
at prices that suit them, that is, at prices at which they choose to exercise their option.
They do not have to perceive themselves as liquidity providers to perform this role.
6 Conclusion
The provision of liquidity is important for well-functioning asset markets. Still, the
liquidity of the foreign exchange market, perhaps the most important financial market, is
a black box. We know that market makers provide liquidity in the intraday market when
exchange rates are floating. This paper addresses the issue of who provides liquidity
overnight in the foreign exchange market.
To this end we use a unique data set from the Swedish foreign exchange market
which covers the trading of several distinct groups over a long time span, from the
beginning of 1993 to the summer of 2002. The distinct groups we analyze are: (i)
Market making banks; (ii) Financial customers; (iii) Non-Financial customers; and (iv)
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the Central Bank.
We use the theory of market making to characterize what to expect of a liquidity
providing group of market participants, if one exists. There are two characteristics of
a liquidity provider: (a) The net currency position of the liquidity provider will be
negatively correlated with the value of the currency; and (b) The trading of the liquidity
provider will be result of passively matching others’ demand and supply.
We have presented several findings supporting the proposition that Non-Financial
customers are the main liquidity providers in the Swedish market. First, we confirm
that there is a positive correlation between the net purchases of currency made by Fi-
nancial customers and changes in the exchange rate. Thus, when Financial investors
buy SEK, the SEK tends to appreciate. The correlation becomes stronger as we lower
the frequency. These findings are consistent with the results of Froot and Ramadorai
(2002) and Fan and Lyons (2003).
Furthermore, we find that the positive correlation between net purchases of currency
of Financial customers and the exchange rate is matched by a negative correlation be-
tween the net purchases of Non-Financial customers and changes in the exchange rate.
The coefficient is not only similar to the one of Financial customers in absolute value,
but is also very stable. These findings lead us to conclude that Non-Financial customers
fulfill requirement (a) above, while Financial customers do not.
Second, we also find that requirement (b) , that the liquidity providers passively
match changes in the demand and supply of others, is supported for the Non-Financial
customers. We find that the trading of Financial customers and Market making banks
can forecast the trading of Non-Financial customers, but not the other way. We interpret
this as evidence that the Non-Financial customer group is not the active part in trading.
Third, in our cointegration analysis we find the two previous points supported for
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the steady-state long run. The permanent effect of Non-Financial customers’ trading is
negative, while the permanent effect of Financial customers’ trading is positive. More
important, we find that there is a close, but opposite, relation between the two flows in
the long-run.
It appears that identifying a liquidity provider has been an important issue. Several
authors, e.g., Hau and Rey (2002) and several papers by Carlson and Osler, utilize the
idea of a liquidity provider comparable to the one identified here. In Carlson and Osler
(2000) “current account” traders fill the role of liquidity providers. They assume that
these “current account” traders’ “demands for currency are [...] determined predomi-
nantly by the level of the exchange rate and by factors unconnected to the exchange rate
which appear random to the rest of the market.”
This paper is a first attempt to address the question of overnight liquidity provision
in the foreign exchange market. To what extent can we expect these findings to be
generalized to other currencies? The SEK is the eight most traded currency according
to the latest BIS survey of the foreign exchange market. The Swedish currency market
is similar to other currency markets in many respects. The trading facilities are similar
for most currency markets. Trading in e.g. USD/EUR, SEK/EUR and other currency
crosses take place at the same systems. Also, the market shares of Financial and Non-
Financial customers found for the Swedish currency market, are very similar to those
found for other currency markets.
Our results have implications for the exchange rate determination puzzle. We doc-
ument that changes in net positions held by Financial or Non-Financial customers are
capable of explaining changes in the foreign exchange rate at frequencies commonly
used in tests of macro economic models. Hence, it is important to acquire more knowl-
edge about which factors determine different FX flows. This will be the focus of our
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future research in this area.
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